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Abstract
Recent research reveals that divorce negatively impacts children’s wel-
fare as a consequence of the reduction in monetary and time contributions of
the non-custodial parent. When the custody arrangement is sole custody,
the variables that link the absent parent to the child are visitations and
child support transfers. We explain visitations and child support transfers
using a behavioral model of competitive equilibrium in which both vari-
ables are the results of competitive allocations realized in a decentralized
non-cooperative manner.
In our framework the mother has control over visitations and the fa-
ther has control over child support. Estimates of the model are used to
simulate the eﬀects of alternative endowment levels on the proportion of
time spent with the noncustodial parent and the ex-post parental income
distribution. Our results show that a more equal allocation of time with the
child, though beneﬁcial to the children, may negatively aﬀect the mother’s
welfare, increasing the income gap between ex-spouses.
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One of the negative consequences of the increasing number of divorces is reduced
income for custodial parents and the children living with her/him. Despite several
attempts to improve the system of child support transfers in the United States,
only about half of the women entitled to child support payments receive the full
amount they are due, and one fourth of households receive no payment at all.
The economic decline in income is not the only way in which children are af-
fected by parents’separation or divorce. Marital dissolution can alter the amount
of time the non-custodial parent (generally the father) spends with the children1.
A reduction in parental time spent with children can determine children’s out-
comes beyond the eﬀect attributable to income contribution. Human capital
accumulation, educational attainment, as well as starting wages and later job
performance may be negatively aﬀected.
There is an important relationship between time spent with the non-custodial
parents and money transfers: parents that maintain close contact with their chil-
dren after divorce have more time to enjoy with them and more ways to monitor
the eﬀect of their transfers on child well-being.
The following table is a cross tabulation of transfers by visitations (low versus
high for each). Note that 80 percent of parents with high visitation rates have high
transfers, while only 36 percent of parents with low transfers have high visitation
rates.
Table 1
Transfers by Visitation Rate
Visitations
Transfers High Low Total
High 275 67 342
Low 130 229 359
Total 405 296 701
In this paper we focus on the link between visitations and child support trans-
fers. As Maccobby and Mnookin (1992) remark, the links between visitation and
1Research focusing on the time spent with father after divorce shows that the proportion of
children seeing their father once a week is quite small, while the proportion of children who have
lost contact with their father is about forty percent (Furstenberg et al. 1987)
2child support payments are reinforced by social values. A father who does not
support his children, “May in popular perception no longer be entitled to main-
tain a relationship with his minor children if the custodial mother objects”. In the
same way, a mother who purposely denies her ex—husband any relationship with
the children “May be viewed as no longer entitled to his support”. The amount
of time the children spend with each parent may be the outcome of an exchange
between mother and father after divorce, where the mother controls the time of
the child and the father acquires this time with his income.
While some empirical ﬁndings and anecdotal evidence show that more time
with the father after divorce would be beneﬁcial for the children in several di-
mensions, no literature to our knowledge has tried to investigate the eﬀect of
alternative time arrangements on the distribution of resources between parents.
We use the results of our model to simulate the eﬀect of a visitation arrangement
similar to joint custody. The results indicate that an allocation of time equivalent
to joint physical custody would leave the mother economically worse oﬀ (rela-
tively to a full custody arrangement) increasing the initial unequal distribution
of resources between the ex-spouses. The increase in child expenditures, however,
partly compensates for the loss of income. We discuss various interpretations and
policy issues.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we discuss some aspects of the
recent literature. Section 2 presents the theoretical model in which parents derive
utility on the time they spend with the children. Section 3 describes the empirical
implementation of the model. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 contains the
solutions to the model. We also solve the model for the equilibrium parameters
and use them to simulate the eﬀect of an endowment of equal time on income
distribution between the two parents. Section 6 extends the model to include the
case in which the parents derive utility from direct expenditures on the children.
Section 7 contains some conclusions and research directions.
1. Recent Literature
While there is an extensive literature analyzing the transfers to children by the
non-custodial parents after divorce, only a limited number of studies have analyzed
the amount of time children spend with their parents after divorce. It has been
shown that a reduction in time spent with one parent can aﬀect children’s lives
along many dimensions, including their human capital accumulation and labor
market performance (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995, Beller, 1993).
3The results of the few empirical studies on the relationship between non-
custodial contributions to children and their involvement in their life after divorce
are quite mixed. A positive relationship has been found in cross-sectional studies
showing that money and time are complements. Paying child support may change
the father-child relationship by increasing the mothers’willingness to let them see
each other. Peters et al (1993) show that the continued involvement between
fathers and children can result in self-enforcing parental visitation and payment
arrangement similar to those in intact families.
According to Wallerstein and Huntington (1983), visitations and the post-
divorce relationship, among other factors, were strongly correlated with child
support payments. In their study, the duration of each visit was found to be
a more accurate measure of the father’s interest in the child than the frequency of
contact. Fustenberg et. al. (1983) also found a positive relationship between com-
pliance with child support award and contact between the father and the child,
proposing that the existence of child support, rather than the amount, seemed
to be related to the maintenance of the relationship between the father and his
child.
Other research has found a negative relationship, implying that child support
payment may increase the conﬂict between the two parents if the child support
enforcement is hostile. When forced to pay child support, fathers see their children
less frequently and live further from them (Mac Lanahan et. al., 1997). Veum
(1993) also analyzes visitations and child support contribution as joint decisions
using instrumental variables. His analysis, based on the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, reports no relationship between child support and visitations.
These diﬀerent results point to the need of further research on this issue.
Using a game-theoretic approach, Weiss and Willis (1985, 1993) provide an
interpretation of the low compliance with child support that has to do with the
time spent with the children. The father’s non-compliance with the child sup-
port order is caused by his lack of monitoring power over the allocation of the
transfer by the mother. In their view, a father who wants to support his child,
but not his ex-spouse, would tend to pay less than the amount he would like to
spend on his child, because he cannot guarantee that the money will be spent on
the child. This implies that more time with the children may facilitate the non-
custodian’s control over the allocation of resources, allowing hir or her to monitor
the outcomes of their expenses. Del Boca and Flinn (1991, 1995) have provided
a theoretic framework in which the behaviors of divorced parents regarding the
sharing of living expenses of their children are the result of optimal decision mak-
4ing. Following their lines, in this paper we analyze the exchange behavior between
visitations and child support payments that the evidence has shown to happen in
real life.
Visitation arrangements and child support transfers are crucial issues in the
negotiation following the divorce of a couple with children. A mother may object
to the children visiting the father regularly, if she does not receive child support
transfers from her ex husband. Similarly, a non-custodial father who is denied
visitations to his children may be more unwilling to pay child support than a
father who is allowed to spend time with them (Maccobby and Mnookin, 1992).
In the models developed in this paper, we ﬁnd that child support transfers
depend only on the father’s income, and not on the income of the mother. Visita-
tions depend on mother’s and father’s incomes, supporting the idea of a negotia-
tion process whereby the father’s income is exchanged against visitations allowed
by the mother. Visitation arrangements, on the one hand, guarantee non-resident
parents an endowment of time with their children. On the other hand, they ensure
the mother’s income transfers to compensate them for the reduction in welfare af-
ter divorce. The results show that a reduction of time under the mother’s control
implies a reduction in the income transfers from the father, and, therefore, a loss
in the mother’s consumption levels.
2. Theoretical Model
In this section we explain visitations, child support payments and child expendi-
tures using a behavioral model of competitive equilibrium in which the variables
are the result of competitive allocations realized in a decentralized non-cooperative
manner. While the importance of institutional constraints on parents’decisions
after divorce is well known (Del Boca and Flinn, 1995, Del Boca and Ribero,
1998), we will not consider these aspects here. In our framework the parents
value the child in two ways: 1) they care about the welfare of the child and 2)
they enjoy spending time with the child. While during marriage, time with the
child is a public good, after separation it becomes a private good.
In this model, parents are divorced and have had one child from the marriage.
Each one of them has preferences deﬁned over the amount of a representative
consumption good, cj, and the amount of time they spend with their child hj,
that can be represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uj(cj,h j),
j ∈{ m,f}, where the subindex m stands for mother and the subindex f stands
for father.
5Both parents have access to two independent sources of income, ym and yf.
At this point, these incomes are assumed to be independent of the time that
each parent spends with the child. In the case of the mother, this assumption is
more problematic, given the possible negative association between labor income
and child care. We will address this issue in future developments of our model.
Without loss of generality, the total time the child can spend with the parents is
normalized to one, so that hm+hf =1 . A critical assumption (that will be relaxed
later) is that the mother has the sole physical custody of the child, because that
guarantees that her initial endowment of “time with the child” is equal to one.
Both parents act simultaneously and the equilibrium is determined in one period.
The behavior of the parents is decentralized and non-cooperative. Each of
them derives their own demand from utility maximization subject only to their
budget constraint, without knowledge of the demands or concern for the tastes
of the other parent.2 In this setting, prices are a signal of scarcity and parents
interact with the market rather than with each other, as in the bargaining models
analyzed by Weiss and Willis (1985) and Del Boca and Flinn (1994, 1995). How-
ever, by virtue of the ﬁrst welfare theorem, and, without the existence of public
goods, this competitive equilibrium is also Pareto optimal. The competitive al-
location is therefore consistent with the maximization of utility of each parent
subject to holding the utility of the other parent constant.
Normalizing the price of the consumption good to one, let p represent the
monetary amount that the father is prepared to pay in order to stay one unit of
time with the child. The budget constraint for each parent guarantees that the
monetary value of the consumption vector cannot exceed the value of the initial
endowment vector. Therefore, if the vector of prices of consumption good and
time with the child is given by 
 p =( 1 ,p), the vector of mother’s consumption
is given by 
 xm =( cm,h m) and her initial endowment is given by 
 wm =( ym,1),3
then the budget constraint for the mother can be expressed as 
 p · 
 xm ≤ 
 p · 
 wm.
Given her total endowment of income and time with the child, the mother chooses
a level of consumption of the private good and time to spend with the child, by
solving the problem:
max um(cm,h m) (2.1)
s.t. cm + phm ≤ ym + p.
2Tastes and preferences of the divorced parents may be interdependent to some extent, givan
an assortative mating argument as the two parents have been married for some time.
3Later, when we drop the mother’s sole custody assumption, the mother’s initial endowmnet
will be given by  wm =( ym,ε),where 0 <ε<1.
6The solution of this problem is given by the mother’s demands cm(p,ym) and
hm(p,ym).
On the other hand, the father’s initial endowment is given only by his monetary
income 
 wf =( yf,0).4 Denoting his vector of consumption by 
 xf =( cf,h f),h i s
budget constraint can be expressed as 
 p ·
 xf ≤ 
 p · 
 wf. He will allocate his income
between the consumption good and time with his child according to the solution
of the problem:
max uf(cf,h f) (2.2)
s.t. cf + phf ≤ yf.
The solution of this problem is given by the father’s demands cf(p,yf) and
hf(p,yf).
The equilibrium of the “market” is given when the sum of the demands for
each good is equated to the aggregate supply, that is the sum of endowments of
each good. Therefore, the market clearing equations are:
cm(p,ym)+cf(p,yf)=ym + yf (2.3)
hm(p,ym)+hf(p,yf)=1 .
Solving for p in the equilibrium equations, we get the solution for the equilibrium
price p and the equilibrium allocations cm,h m,c f and hf. These variables must
satisfy the equilibrium conditions given by:
MRSm(cm,h m)=MRSf(cf,h f), (2.4)
cm + cf = ym + yf,
hm + hf =1 ,
cm + phm = ym + p
MRSm(cm,h m)=p,
where MRSj are j’s marginal rates of substitution between consumption and time
with the child, j ∈{ m,f}.
The ﬁrst equation means that the equilibrium allocation has to be Pareto
optimal. The next two guarantee that it must be feasible. The fourth equation
means that the allocation has to be in the budget constraint of the parents, and
4Later, when we drop the mother’s sole custody assumption, the father’s initial endowment
will be given by  wf =( yf,1 − ε),where 0 <ε<1.
7the last one that the price line is tangent to the indiﬀerence curves of both parents
in equilibrium. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is guaranteed by
the assumptions made on the utility functions.5
The child support transfer is the amount of money that the father pays to the
mother, which in this model represents the cost of the time to be spent with the
child. Therefore, denoting the child support transfer by t,w eh a v e :
t(ym,y f)=p(ym,y f)hf(ym,y f). (2.5)
Deﬁne the total visitation time obtained by the father to be equal to hf,t h a ti s ,
the time the father spends with the child. Thus, denoting the visitations by v,w e
have:
v(ym,y f)=hf(ym,y f). (2.6)
The following ﬁgure shows how the exchange between visitations and transfers
takes place. It is an Edgeworth box with the consumption good on the horizontal
axis and the time to spend with the child on the vertical one. By assumption,
the vertical side of the box has length one and the length of the horizontal side
is the sum of the incomes of the father and the mother. The bottom left corner
is the mother’s origin and the top right corner is the father’s origin. The initial
endowment is represented by the point w that correspond to the allocation 
 wm =
(ym,1), from the mother’s origin and to point 
 wf =( yf,0), from the father’s
origin.
The contract curve is the set of allocations in which the marginal rates of
substitution are equal for the father and the mother, represented in the graph by
the curve cc. The equilibrium allocation is represented by the point r,ap o i n t
on the contract curve. The line that crosses w and r is the price line, and has
slope −p−1. The horizontal distance between w and r is the child support transfer
t(ym,y f), and the vertical distance is the visitations time: v(ym,y f). (Figure 2.1)
5Technically, for existence of the equilibrium, it is assumed that the utility functions of both
parents are such that the “better than” sets are closed, and strictly convex, satisfy local non-
satiation and the tangency between the two indiﬀerence curves does not occur in the corners.
For uniqueness of the equilibrium, it is assumed that the consumption good and the time with
the child are gross substitutes, i.e. that an increase in the price of one of the goods implies an
increase in the excess demand of the other one.
8Figure 2.1:
Exchange between Visitations and Child Support
9The comparative statics predictions of this model are summarized in the fol-
lowing lemma.










dcm ≤ 0, (2.7)
the equilibrium allocations change with respect to income variations in a way
described by the following derivatives:
dcm(ym,y f)/dym ≥ 0,d c m(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,d c f(ym,y f)/dym ≶ 0,
dcf(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,d h m(ym,y f)/dym ≥ 0,d h m(ym,y f)/dyf ≤ 0,
dhf(ym,y f)/dym ≤ 0,d h f(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,
dp(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,d p (ym,y f)/dym ≶ 0.
(2.8)
These relationships are proved by taking total derivatives in the equations that
deﬁne the equilibrium and following standard comparative statics methods. See
Appendix 1 for details.
The signs of the derivatives are consistent with the intuition of the exchange
that takes place between the parents. According to the model, the higher the
income of the father, the less time the mother spends with the child because
fathers with higher income have more capacity to buy time with the child as well
as their own consumption good. Similarly, higher income fathers spend more time
with their children. Also, the mothers who have more income spend more time
with the child, leaving less time for the father to spend with the child.
Some of the signs of the derivatives are ambiguous. For example, it is uncertain
how a change in the income of the mother will aﬀect the consumption allocation
of the father or the equilibrium price. On the one hand, it may be that the
increase in ym increases her demand for time with the child. This may aﬀect the
equilibrium price, making it more expensive for the father to buy time with the
child. Then he can either increase his consumption of the other good cf,o rh e
may pay the higher price for time with the child, decreasing his consumption of
the good.
The derivatives for the variables of interest are derived from the derivatives in
2.8 and the deﬁnitions of t and v given in 2.5 and 2.6. They can be summarized
as:
dt(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,d t (ym,y f)/dym ≶ 0,
dv(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,d v (ym,y f)/dym ≤ 0.
10The model implies that fathers with higher incomes transfer more and visit
more, that the mother’s income has an ambiguous eﬀect on child support transfers,
and that mothers with higher incomes allow fewer visitations. These comparative
statics results are helpful in understanding the changes in transfers and visitations
that may occur in diﬀerent situations. For example, if the mother gets remarried,
this may imply an increase in her income, since she is now with a partner that
may support her. In the context of the model, this would imply an increase in her
consumption of the good and of time with the child, with a consequent decrease in
the father’s visitation time. A joint physical custody agreement that we consider
below may be considered a reallocation of time endowment with consequences
for child support transfers, and, consequently, on the mothers total consumption
levels. Mandatory child support orders, such as the ones implemented in some
states like Wisconsin, might be considered like an “ad hoc” decrease in the income
of the father, with possible detrimental consequences on the visitations time for
the fathers.
3. Empirical Implementation
Consider the speciﬁcation of the model with Cobb-Douglas utility functions for
both parents:
uj(cj,h j)=δjlog(cj)+( 1− δj)log(hj) (3.1)
δj ∈ (0,1),j ∈{ m,f},c j > 0,h j > 0.
Given her total endowment of income and time with the child, the mother
chooses a level of own consumption of the private good and time to spend with
the child, solving problem 2.1. Her demands are:
cm(δm,p,y m)=δm(p + ym), (3.2)




The father allocates his income between consumption good and time with his
child, according to the solution of problem 2.2. His demands are:
cf(δf,p,y f)=δfyf, (3.3)




11The equilibrium price and allocations are given by:
p(δm,δf,y m,y f)=
(1 − δm)ym +( 1− δf)yf
δm
, (3.4)
cm(δf,y f,y m)=( 1 − δf)yf + ym,
hm(δm,δf,y m,y f)=
(1 − δm)[ym +( 1− δf)yf]





(1 − δm)ym +( 1− δf)yf
.
This utility function satisﬁes assumption 2.7. Under this speciﬁcation, changes
in the income of the mother do not alter the consumption allocation of the father.
The child support transfer t is given by:
t(δf,y f)=phf(δm,δf,y m,y f)=( 1− δf)yf, (3.5)
and the visitations time v is given by:
v(δm,δf,y m,y f)=hf(δm,δf,y m,y f)=
δm(1 − δf)yf
(1 − δm)ym +( 1− δf)yf
. (3.6)
The child support transfer depends solely on the father’s income. The visitations
depend on the income of the father, as well as on the income of the mother.
In cases in which it is assumed that the mother is not e n d o w e dw i t ha l lo f
the child’s time, but only with a portion ε of the time (ε<1), the equilibrium
allocations are given by:
p(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=
(1 − δf)yf +( 1− δm)ym
δmε + δf(1 − ε)
, (3.7)
cm(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=
δm[(ε + δf(1 − ε))ym +( 1− δf)εyf]
δmε + δf(1 − ε)
,
hm(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=
(1 − δm)[(ε + δf(1 − ε))ym +( 1− δf)εyf]
(1 − δm)ym +( 1− δf)yf
,
cf(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=
δf[(1 − δm)(1 − ε)ym +( 1− ε + δmε)yf]
δmε + δf(1 − ε)
,
hf(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=( 1 − δf)(1 − ε)+
[δ
2
f(ε − 1) − δf(δmε + ε − 1) + δmε]yf
(1 − δm)ym +( 1− δf)yf
.
12In this case the child support transfer is computed considering that the father
pays only for the time with the child additional to his endowment (1−ε). Similarly,
the visitations time is deﬁned as the time that the father spends with the child
apart from his endowment (1−ε). The child support transfer and visitations are
given by:
t(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=p[hf − (1 − ε)] (3.8)
=
δm(1 − δf)εyf − ymδf(1 − ε)(1 − δm)
δmε + δf(1 − ε)
v(yf,δf,ε)=hf − (1 − ε)
=( −δf)(1 − ε)+
[δ
2
f(ε − 1) − δf(δmε + ε − 1) + δmε]yf
(1 − δm)ym +( 1− δf)yf
.
4. Data issues.
The data for this study are from the NLS of the high school class of 1972 - 5th
follow up. This wave of the survey was taken in 1986. Out of the 12,841 re-
spondents of the survey, we selected those who have been legally married and
divorced or separated at least once, have had one child from that marriage, and
the physical custody of the child was assigned to the mother. The important issue
of non response bias is analyzed in Ribero (1994). We also select cases with pos-
itive non-custodian incomes and child support transfers, because the model does
not allow for corner solutions. The respondents in the sample know the marital
status of their ex-spouses at the time of the survey and have provided information
regarding visitation behavior, as well as child support and expenditures besides
child support. The selection process for the data set is described in Appendix 2.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables. The proportion of remar-
ried fathers is higher than the proportion of remarried mothers, and the income
of fathers is higher than the income of mothers. Child support transfers are on
average $2,321 a year. Visitations are on average 46 days per year.6 The con-
struction of the visitations variable is reported in Appendix 3. The data set also
contains information on child expenditures of the non-custodial parent after child
support. The construction of this variable is described in Appendix 3.
6This is equivalent to 12.6% of 365 days a year.
13As a ﬁrst look at the data, Table 3 reports an ordinary least squares analysis of
visitations, child support transfers and the fathers’child expenditures. Visitations
are positively inﬂuenced by parental incomes, while child support transfers depend
only on the father’s income. Father remarriage has a negative eﬀect on the time
spent with children, as well as on child support transfers. His income is reduced
by the responsibilities for the new family, and, as a consequence, he will pay less
transfers and visit the child less. On the other hand, the remarriage of the mother
may instead imply a higher level of her income, with the implication of less time
allowed to the father. The duration of marriage has a positive eﬀect on visitations,
but it is not signiﬁcant. The longer the marriage before separation, the higher
the probability that parents act more cooperatively. As well, the father and
the children may have had time to build stronger ties. The empirical results are
quite coherent, with the predictions and interpretations obtained by the model
described in Section 2.
14Table 2
Means and standard deviations
(Sample with positive child support transfers)
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
% Mother remarriage 57.9% -
%Father remarriage 62.2% -
Mother’s income 7,155 6,102
Father’s income 16,822 9,354
%Mother with some college 27% -
%Father with some college 35% -
Duration of marriage 5.02 2.81
Duration of divorce 6.26 3.84
Child support transfers 2,321 2,028
Visitations (days per year) 46 39.5
Index of child expenditures 0.375 0.268
Number of cases 233
15Table 3
OLS estimates of visitations, child support transfers and father’s
expenditures on the child
Standard errors in parentheses
Variables Visitations Transfers Index of child
expenditures
Constant 33.716 145.406 1.200
Father’s income .490 .221 .026
(.149) (.110 ) (.007)
Mother’s income .459 .136 .013
(.245) (.181) (.011 )
Father remarriage -1.489 20.487 .102
(3.148) (22.050) (.149)
Mother remarriage -2.387 -25.975 -.073
(3.098) ( 22.051 ) (.147)
Duration of marriage -.179 .847 .031
(.765) (5.319) (.035)
Duration of divorce -1.038 -8.500 -.023
(.591) (4.130) (.027)
F-test 6.15 4.53 6.02
Number of cases 635 595 701
165. Solutions
The empirical implementation of the model analyzed in Section 3 can be used to
solve for the equilibrium levels of visitation and transfers, conditional on the model
parameters and on the distribution of endowments. In this case, the variables
which fully capture the endowments are ym,y f, and ε, where ε is the proportion
of time with the child which is given to the mother as an endowment. That is,
if the mother is assumed to be entitled to all of the child’s time, then ε =1 .
We will also consider the case where the father is entitled, or endowed, with one
day each week of time with the child, then ε =0 .86.7 Given the values of δm
and δf and the endowment ε, we can solve for t and v from equations 3.5 and
3.6. Alternatively, given values of t and v and the endowment ε, these equations
can be inverted to solve for the (implied) preference parameters of the parents.
This procedure assumes that the preferences are heterogeneous in the population
of divorced parents. The advantage of this technique is that no assumptions
regarding the joint distribution or constancy of parental preferences are required.
The main drawback is the fact that no provision is made for measurement errors
or other types of data unreliability.
Equations 3.5 and 3.6 implicitly assume that ε =1 , that is, that the mother is
endowed with all of the child’s time. In this case, inverting the model as described
above gives the following expressions for the parental preference parameters:


















In the numerical exercises reported below, we have obtained values for the
parental preference parameters under the alternative assumptions that ε =1or
ε =0 .86.
7This number results from calculating 52 days per year and dividing by 365.
17The values (means and standard deviations) of the parameters obtained from
these equations are in Table 4. The father’s preferences parameter δf is 0.85 and
the mother’s preferences parameter δm is 0.31, implying that the mothers are less
selﬁsh than the fathers. The value of the mother’s preference parameter is very
diﬀerent from the father’s preference parameter (a smaller diﬀerence between the
two parameters was found in Del Boca and Flinn, 1995). This result depends
crucially on the assumption of full time endowment to the mother. Under the
assumption that the father has an initial endowment of one day a week (ε =
0.86), the obtained values are less diﬀerent from each other, the mother preference
parameter is 0.34 and the father’s preference parameter is 0.64.
We are now interested in simulating the outcomes in terms of mother’s avail-
able income and father’s visitations under ε =0 .5, an initial endowment that we
c a nc l a i mg i v e sb o t hp a r e n t st h es a m er i g h t si nt e r m so ft i m et os p e n dw i t ht h e
children (such as a joint custody agreement).
Table 5 reports the results of this exercise using the preference parameters
obtained under the alternative assumptions that ε =1or ε =0 .86, compared
with the observed values. These results show that under an agreement in which
both parents are entitled to the same amount of time, visitations are 34 percent
of the total time and 47 percent respectively (using the preference parameters
obtained under the two alternative assumptions). The income available to the
mother (the sum of her income and the father’s transfer) decreases when the
time with the child is distributed equally among both parents under both sets of
parameters. This means that in that case the mother cannot “sell” all the time
to the father given that a portion of time is endowed to him. In both cases her
available income is lower than the observed one. Using the values of the preference
parameters obtained under ε =0 .86, the father is less selﬁsh and he sells less time
with the child to the mother.
6. Extensions
The model can be extended by assuming that the parents derive utility not only
from their own consumption and the time spent with the child, but also from
the amount of consumption good allocated to the child. Let kf be the private
expenditures the father makes on the child. The price of the consumption good for
the child is assumed to be one, the same as the price of the parents consumption.
The utility functions of the parents are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas of the form:




δif =1 ,δ m ∈ (0,1),δif ∈ (0,1),i ∈{ 1,2,3},c j > 0,h j > 0.
We assume that the mother’s expenditures on the child’s consumption are
equivalent to her own consumption expenditures, given that she lives with the
child and it is diﬃcult to distinguish between her consumption and the child’s
consumption. Then cm in this case denotes the consumption of the mother and
the child together. This assumption is necessary because of data constraints, given
that the data does not contain information about expenditures of the custodial
parent on the child. Given her total endowment of income and time with the
child, the mother chooses a level of own consumption of the private good and
time to spend with the child, solving problem 2.1. Her demands for c and h are
the same as in 3.2.
The father allocates his income between consumption good, time with his child
and private expenditures on the child, according to the solution of a problem
similar to 2.2 but adapted for his new utility function and budget constraint. See







Solving for the equilibrium allocations and based on the deﬁnitions of t, v and
kf, we have the following:
t(yf)=phf(δm,δf,y m,y f)=δ2fyf, (6.3)
v(ym,y f)=hf(δm,δf,y m,y f)=
δmδ2fyf
(1 − δm)ym + δ2fyf
,
kf(yf)=δ3fyf.
Given the observed values of t,v and k,w ec a ni n v e r tt h em o d e lt os o l v ef o r
the “implied” preference parameters of the parents: δm,δ 1f,δ2f and δ3f.O n c e
again, we are assuming that the preferences are heterogeneous in the population
of divorced parents.
19The equations for t,v and k above implicitly assume that ε =1 , that is, that
the mother is endowed with all of the child’s time. In this case, inverting equations
6.3 gives the following expressions for the parental preference parameters:



















In the cases in which ε<1, the child support transfer, the visitations (apart
from the endowment) and the amount of expenditures of the father on the child
other than child support are given by:
t(δm,δf,y m,y f,ε)=p[hf − (1 − ε)] (6.5)
=
(δ2f − 1)(1 − δm)(1 − ε)ym+δmδ2fεym
δmε +( 1− δ2f)(1 − ε)
,
v(yf,δf,ε)=hf − (1 − ε)
=( 1 − δ2f)(1 − ε)+
[(1 − δ2f)(1 − ε)+δmε]δ2fyf
(1 − δm)ym + δ2fyf
,
kf(yf,,y m,ε)=
δ3f[(1 − δm)(1 − ε)ym +( 1− ε + δmε)yf]
δmε +( 1− δ2f)(1 − ε)
.
In particular, for this implementation it is possible to sign the derivative of kf with
respect to the amount of endowment that is initially given to the mother (ε). The
derivative of kf with respect to ε is negative, i.e. the father that is given more
time with the child spends more on items other than child support. A similar
result is reported in Del Boca and Ribero (1998). Combining these equations it






v(yf − kf − t)






δ3f(ε,yf,t,v,k f)=1 − δ1f − δ2f.
The numerical exercises reported in Table 6 show the values for the parental
preference parameters under the alternative assumptions that ε =1or ε =0 .86.
In the exercises reported below the father’s endowments are arbitrarily added to
the observed visitations from the data.
We are interested in simulating the outcomes in terms of mother’s available in-
come and father’s visitations under ε =0 .5, an initial endowment similar to joint
custody. Table 7 reports the results of this exercise using the preference param-
eters obtained under the assumptions that ε =1and that ε =0 .86 alternatively,
compared with the observed values. The results indicate that an endowment of
equal time for both parents, though beneﬁcial to the children, leaves the mother
worse oﬀ, by increasing the income disparity between the two parents. However,
the increase in the father’s voluntary transfers to the child could partially compen-
sate the mother’s reduction in total consumption (by reducing her expenditures
on the child).
Some of the expenditures considered here concern health care or vacation,
and are related to the father’s involvement with the child’s everyday life. Other
expenditures, instead, may not substitute mother’s expenditures, since they are
related more closely to the child’s life with the father when the child spends a
considerable amount of time with the non residential father. For example, in joint
phisical custody arrangements the child has often a room in both parents’home,
as well as a set of clothes and items necessary to meet the child’s needs. These
are expenditures that both parents have to make in order to allow the child to live
with them.
Therefore visitations have a crucial role in determining the post-divorce dis-
tribution of incomes between parents. On one hand they guarantee the father a
positive amount of time with the child. On the other hand they guarantee the
mother the ability to continue to share her ex-husband’s income. These results
conﬁrm our previous ﬁnding (Del Boca and Ribero, 1998) that households with
joint custody arrangements have higher child expenditures than households with
sole custody arrangements. A custody arrangement that allows both parents to
21share responsibility and time with the child has a positive eﬀect on mandated as
well as voluntary transfers to the child.
22Table 4
Values of mother’s and father’s preferences parameters
Basic model
Mean Standard deviation
δm(ε =1 ) .311 .249
δf(ε =1 ) .847 .092
δm(ε =0 .86) .340 .261
δf(ε =0 .86) .640 .194
Table 5
Mother’s consumption and father’s time with child
Outcomes under ε =0 .5
Observed Using ˆ δ(ε =1 ) Using ˆ δ(ε =0 .86)
cm 9,476 4,559 5,904
(6,640) (5,054) (5,346)
v .126 .345 .473
(.108) (.304) (.084)
23Table 6
Values of mother’s and father’s preferences parameters
Extended model
Mean Standard deviation
δm(ε =1 ) .311 .249
δ1f(ε =1 ) .765 .135
δ2f(ε =1 ) .152 .092
δ3f(ε =1 ) .083 .079
δm(ε =0 .86) .340 .261
δ1f(ε =0 .86) .586 .193
δ2f(ε =0 .86) .359 .194
δ3f(ε =0 .86) .060 .058
Table 7
Mother’s consumption, father’s time with child and father’s
expenditures on child
Outcomes under ε =0 .5
Observed Using ˆ δ(ε =1 ) Using ˆ δ(ε =0 .86)
cm 9,476 4,569 5,904
(6,640) (5054) (5,346)
v 0.126 .345 .473
(0.108) (0.161) (0.084)
k 1,125 1,627 1,478
(805) (1,403) (1,171)
247. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a neoclassical interpretation of the exchange be-
tween divorced parents when they make decisions on child support transfers and
visitations. We explain visitations and child support using a behavioral model
of competitive equilibrium in a framework in which the mother has control over
visitations and the father has control over child support. We analyze and compare
two models: 1) parents derive utility only from their own consumption and time
spent with the child, and, 2) parents derive utility also from the amount of con-
sumption good allocated to the child. We use estimates of the models to simulate
the eﬀects of alternative endowment levels on the proportion of time spent with
the non-custodial parent and the ex-post parental income distribution as well as
on child expenditures.
While empirical ﬁndings have indicated that more time with the father after
divorce would be beneﬁcial for the children in several dimensions, no literature to
our knowledge has tried to investigate the eﬀect on the distribution of resources
between the parents. The results of our analysis show that a more equal share
of time with the children leaves the mother economically worse oﬀ. However, the
solution to our second model indicates that a more equal distribution of time in-
creases child expenditures, partially compensating for the mother’s loss of welfare.
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27Appendix 1
Comparative Static Analysis for the Model of Exchange between Child
Support and Visitations
In this appendix we explain the process to derive the conclusions of Lemma 1.













cm + cf = ym + yf (7.2)
cf + phf = yf (7.3)






Diﬀerentiating totally equation 7.1 we get:






































Diﬀerentiating totally equations 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 we get:
dcm + dcf = dym + dyf (7.7)
dcf + pdhf + hfdp = dyf (7.8)











1 dp =0 (7.10)
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The signs of the derivatives that are consistent with the assumption of concave
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 =( N − C)(Bhf − u
m




jk ≥ 0 for all j,k ∈{ m,f} and all i ∈{ m,f} ,w eh a v et h e
following signs for the variables:
N ≥ 0,A ≤ 0,C ≤ 0,
D ≥ 0,R ≥ 0,B ≤ 0,
and therefore:




A − D ≤ 0,
29but the sign of Rhf − um




If this assumption holds, then:
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We will also assume that this determinant is diﬀerent than zero, in order for the
system to have solution. Under this assumption, taking the equations system 7.11
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Using Cramer’s rule to get the derivatives with respect to ym,we have that:




m − Bhf)]/δ ≥ 0,
dhm/dym =[ −Nu
1
m + RChf]/δ ≥ 0,
dcf/dym =[ −N[pu
1
m − Bhf] − (A − D)Rhf]/δ,
dp/dym =[ −NB+ R(A − D)+pRC]/δ.
The latter two derivatives can not be signed without further assumptions.





NA − DC 0
101 0































Using Cramer’s rule you get the derivatives with respect to yf :
dcm/dyf =[ C(pu
1
m − Bhf)]/δ ≥ 0,
dhm/dyf =[ ( −u
1
m + Rhf)C]/δ ≤ 0,
dcf/dyf =[ −N[pu
1
m − Bhf] − (A − D)(Rhf − u
1
m)]/δ ≥ 0,
dp/dyf =[ ( −B + Rp)C]/δ ≥ 0.
30Appendix 2
Data selection
The Table included in this appendix describes the process of selection to gen-
erate the data set used in the paper. The universe of analysis contained the 701
divorced couples with one child provided by the survey. The additional selection
criteria are speciﬁed in bold at the left column.
Criteria Dropped Kept
Custody Joint custody Sole custody
[n=66] [n=635]




Visitations missing Visitations allowed
[n=19] [n=525]
Father’s income yf =0 y f > 0
yf [n=103] [n=422]
yf < 12 ∗ t yf ≥ 12 ∗ t
[n=4] [n=418]
Mother’s income ym missing ym not missing
ym [n=27] [n=391]
Child support t =0 t>0






Construction of the visitations variable and the index of expendi-
tures of the non-custodian father on the child diﬀerent than child sup-
port
In this appendix we explain the way in which the visitations variable and the
index representing the expenditures of the non-custodial father on the child other
than child support were built. The information for these two variables comes from
the National Longitudinal Survey of High School Class of 1972 - 5th Follow Up
in the categoric formats described below.
Question regarding visitations:
“What was the visitations agreement?”
a) Sees the child once a week
b) Sees child twice a month
c) Sees child once a month
d) Sees child on vacations
e) Sees child at no speciﬁc times
f) No visitations allowed
This information is used to build a variable representing a proxy for the number
of times in a year in which the non-custodial parent visits the child. It is assumed
that each visit lasts at least 2 days.8 The visitation variable v is deﬁned as the
proportion of days in the year in which a visit took place to match the theory
we construct in the next section. The “continuous” visitations variable is built as
follows:
8This is also conﬁrmed by data from the Stanford Child Custody Project that provided
detailed information on visitation arrangements (Peters et. al., 1993).
32Construction of the visitations variable
A n s w e r s N u m b e ro fd a y s v F r e q u e n c y
Sees child once a week 104 .285 83
Sees child twice a month 52 .142 24
Sees child once a month 26 .071 3
Sees child on vacations 13 .036 60
Sees child at no speciﬁc times 8 .022 63
No visitations allowed 0 0 53
Question regarding expenditures of the father on the child other than
child support :
Other than child support payments that your ﬁrst spouse may make, how reg-
ularly does your ﬁrst spouse do the following?
a) pay for clothes for the child?
b) pay for gifts for the child?
c) take the child on vacation?
d) pay for routine dental care?
e) carry medical insurance for the child?
f) pay child’s medical bills?
Each question above had an answer in the format shown in the second column
below:
Frequency Code Value
very regularly 1 1
regularity scale 2 2 0.5
regularity scale 3 3 0.33
regularity scale 4 4 0.25
never 5 0
In order to use this information we used a transformation of the answers that
assigns to the answers a number between zero and one in the way indicated in the
last column above. For each father, the corresponding values in the last column for
33the six questions were added, and the result was divided by six. The ﬁnal number
constitutes an index between zero and one that indicates the degree of frequency
with which the father makes “other expenditures diﬀerent than child support”.
To build the variable kf used in the model estimation, this index was multiplied
$3,000, assuming that this is the amount spent per year by a non-custodial father
who spends “very regularly” in all the categories. Even though the value of
$3,000 as a maximum seems rather large, less than 8% of non-custodian parents
respond “very regularly” for all items. With this assumption 50% of parents would
be spending less than $660 per year on “other expenditures diﬀerent than child
support.”
34Appendix 4
Derivation of the model with father’s private expenditures on the
child
In this appendix, the model is developed for the case in which the private
consumption of the child for the non-custodial father is considered as an argument
of the non-custodial father’s utility function. The assumptions of this model are
the same as those for the theoretical model from Section 2. Let kf be the private
consumption of the child. The utility function of the father is assumed to be of
the form uf(cf,h f,k f) and the one of the mother has the form um(cm,h m).
The problem of the mother and the derived demands are the same as in 2.1
and 3.2. The problem for the father is to:
max uf(cf,h f,k f) (7.12)
s.t. cf + phf + kf ≤ yf.
The equilibrium conditions are:
cm(p,ym)+cf(p,yf)+kf(p,yf)=ym + yf (7.13)
hm(p,ym)+hf(p,yf)=1 .
The solution for the equilibrium price and allocations results from equations:
MRSm(cm,h m)=MRSf(cf,h f)=p (7.14)
MRSm(cm,h m)=MRSf(kf,h f)
MRSf(cf,k f)=1
cm + cf + kf = ym + yf,
hm + hf =1 ,
cm + phm = p + ym.
Lemma 2:
Under assumption 2.7, the comparative static results of Lemma 1 hold for the
model of private consumption of the child. In addition we have:
dkf(ym,y f)/dyf ≥ 0,d k f(ym,y f)/dym ≶ 0.
35Under the assumption that the utility functions of the father and mother are
Cobb-Douglas of the form described in 6.1, the equilibrium price and allocations
are given by:
p(ym,y f)=
(1 − δm)ym + δ2fyf
δm
, (7.15)
cm(yf,y m)=δ2fyf + ym,
hm(ym,y f)=
(1 − δm)[ym + δ2fyf]





(1 − δm)ym + δ2fyf
,
kf(yf)=δ3fyf.
When the model is solved for the case in which ε<1, the equilibrium price
and allocations are given by:
p(ym,y f,ε)=
δ2fyf +( 1− δm)ym
δmε +( 1− δ2f)(1 − ε)
, (7.16)
cm(yf,y m,ε)=
δm[(1 − δ2f(1 − ε))ym + δ2fεyf]
δmε +( 1− δ2f)(1 − ε)
,
hm(ym,y f,ε)=1 − δ2f(1 − ε) −
[(1 − δ2f)(1 − ε)+δmε]δ2fyf
(1 − δm)ym + δ2fyf
,
cf(yf,y m,ε)=
δ1f[(1 − δm)(1 − ε)ym +( 1− ε + δmε)yf]
δmε +( 1− δ2f)(1 − ε)
,
hf(ym,y f,ε)=
δ2f[(1 − δm)(1 − ε)ym +( 1− ε + δmε)yf]
(1 − δm)ym + δ2fyf
,
kf(yf,,y m,ε)=
δ3f[(1 − δm)(1 − ε)ym +( 1− ε + δmε)yf]
δmε +( 1− δ2f)(1 − ε)
.
36